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Abstract 
Actions are the basis for moral judgment. In this paper, I develop a concept of action that 
illustrates the differences between bad, evil, and sadistic actions. Using this theory of action, I 
apply it to punishment theory and the philosophy of criminal law. Bad and evil actions are 
defined by differences in their magnitude, as measured by the ability of the victim to recover 
from harm. I propose that sadistic actions comprise a qualitatively unique form of wrongdoing. 
They are performed following a bad or evil action with the intent to add insult to injury. I 
propose that within a retributivist framework, this theory of action allows for a more effective 
approach to punishing bad and evil actions. And within a consequentialist framework, this theory 
of action allows for a more effective approach to punishing sadistic actions. 
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 3 
Introduction 
 
Humans are primarily judged (morally) by their actions. People can only be punished for 
their actions because actions are the basis for moral judgment. In this thesis, I will examine the 
differences between bad, evil, and sadistic actions. I contend that bad and evil actions differ 
merely in terms of magnitude, while sadistic actions incorporate a conceptually distinct element 
of wrongdoing: insult to injury. I will then explain the consequences these differences have for 
retributivism, consequentialism, and punishment. 
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-Chapter 1- 
A Theory of Action 
 
I define action as an event that is sequenced in the order of reflection and execution. I 
define reflection as the thought relating to the possible consequences of action before execution. 
This means that reflection is only incorporated into an action if the action itself is performed. If 
one reflects on an action, and chooses to not perform the action at all, then the action did not 
occur. For example, before eating an apple, I may reflect on that act and think about the healthy 
properties the apple had, and how these properties will confer additional healthy benefits to my 
well being. On the other hand, before eating an entire chocolate cake, I may reflect on that act 
and anticipate its negative consequences for my health. I define execution as the series of 
movements that collectively form the action. For example, in the action of picking up a glass, 
execution is the movement of my hand to grasp and lift the glass. 
This theory of action is helpful for the following reasons. First, it incorporates the 
interactions between the mental and physical elements of an action. Thoughts have the unique 
power to shift behavior. Actions that are guided by a thought process can be modified and altered 
during execution. For example, in a game of football, I may decide to throw the ball to my friend 
to the right, but upon processing new information as defenders approach, I may decide that 
throwing it to my friend to the left would be the better decision. Thus, reflection played a role in 
guiding the execution of my action. This compares with Donald Davidson’s theory of action that 
an action is “ something an agent does that was ‘intentional under some description1. Like 
Davidson, I contend that there is a conceptual link between action and intention. An in-depth 
                                                
1 Davidson, Donald, 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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discussion of intention, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. While the use of this term 
may unnecessarily conjure up potential objections on the basis of its nebulous properties, I use 
the term “intention” as a basic reference to some active thought process relating to the execution 
of the action. And here is where I diverge from Davidson: rather than view intention as a basis 
for action, I argue that it simply affects and helps distinguish between different types of actions. I 
do not argue that intentional actions are the only genuine actions. Later I shall discuss the role 
my concept of action plays in distinguishing between bad, evil, and sadistic actions, and how we 
can punish them accordingly. It is important to reiterate that I apply my theory of action as a tool 
for conceptually distinguishing between different forms of wrongdoing, therefore aiding 
punishment. I do not contend that this theory of action is ideal for analyzing action under all 
circumstances. When considering actions, however, it is important to understand the crucial role 
they play in the need for, and design of, punishment. 
Only actions can be punished. An individual cannot be punished for doing nothing. 
Punishment, by definition, is performed in response to a morally reprehensible act. Without the 
prerequisite act, there can be no punishment.  For example, I cannot punish my friend for having 
brown colored eyes. If I were to harm my friend for having brown eyes, then my actions would 
not be punishment; they would be assault. However, when an individual commits an action that 
violates rules of conduct, he or she is punished in response.  
This is one of many features that distinguish punishment from crime. When people are 
“punished” for not doing anything, then this “punishment” becomes criminal. If I “punished” my 
friend for having brown eyes, then I have essentially harmed him not for his actions, but for his 
identity. This idea of punishing people for who they are rather than what they have done forms 
one of many ideological justifications for genocide. By attacking one’s identity rather than one’s 
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actions, and rationalizing it as “punishment”, many war criminals have been able to initiate the 
level of political, social, and military mobilization needed to commit acts of genocide. By 
attacking the Tutsis for their ethnic identity, Hutu forces were able to rationalize over 500,000 
murders2. This idea of using character assassination to justify punishment sheds light on many 
historical figures that used this technique to propel their crimes. 
Therefore, punishment can only be justified if it is performed in response to an action. As 
a prerequisite condition, this action logically infringes upon a predetermined set of moral norms 
or code of conduct. Only then can punishment be introduced into a framework of justice. By 
justice, I refer to the societal response to a violation of a moral code. When an individual 
commits a crime, they have violated a moral norm, resulting in an injustice. This injustice places 
the existing state of affairs in an imbalance between the criminal and the victim. Therefore, the 
authorities try to respond with an appropriate punishment. We can thus view justice as the 
application of guiding principles in order to correct a moral imbalance in the existing state of 
affairs. 
 The question of how to administer punishment is an ongoing, and relevant, discussion. 
Two prominent, and competing, theories of punishment are retributivism and consequentialism. 
Retributivists believe that people should get what they deserve. This dessert takes the form of 
fitting punishment. By “fitting”, theorists mean that the punishment’s properties are closely 
tailored to match the magnitude of the infraction committed. In contrast, consequentialists 
believe that what justifies punishment is a consequence of inflicting it. For example, punishment 
is justified if it rehabilitates the individual from criminal behavior, or deters the individual from 
committing crimes in the future.  
                                                
2 Des Forges, Alison (1999). Leave No One to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. Human Rights Watch. ISBN 1-
56432-171-1. Retrieved January 12, 2007. 
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 Thus far, we have established that only actions can be punished. An action can be a 
singular instance, or multiple instances. An atrocity can be a single instance or multiple 
instances. For example, the Hiroshima bombing was committed through the singular action of 
pushing the release button on a weapons trigger in the Enola Gay3.  The Aurora, Colorado 
shooting and Sandy Hook Shooting were the result of multiple actions4,5. The Rwandan 
Genocide was the result of multiple actions committed by multiple people6. A comparing of 
these atrocities illustrates differences in the potential distribution of blame. The question is how 
we can assign blame according to the action committed. This is not an easy discussion, and the 
idea of blameworthiness is still contentious. Finding the most effective way to appropriate blame 
for criminal acts is problematic because it requires authorities to weigh actions differently. For 
example, while Adolf Eichmann may have given his approval to murder countless individuals, 
he may or may not have been more blameworthy than the individual who actually pulled the 
trigger. Both were technically responsible for the victim’s death, but their role in the action was 
different. Assuming Eichmann was assigned more blame because of his role in organizing and 
authorizing these actions, it is not clear how one would do so, and according to what standards of 
evaluation. It has no reliably determinable calculus because the circumstances surrounding each 
individual’s involvement in a criminal act constantly vary. Therefore, I am not going to grapple 
with that problem in this paper because my primary focus is on the distinction between bad, evil, 
and sadistic actions. 
 Before entering a discussion of bad, evil, and sadistic actions, however, with the topic of 
Eichmann on hand, I would like to address an objection that Leo Zaibert made to Hannah 
                                                
3 "The Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki." History.com. A&E Television Networks, n.d. Web. 10 Apr. 2013. 
4 "James Holmes Appears in Court Being Accused of Killing 12 People in Aurora Cinema 
Shooting." BelleNews.com. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Apr. 2013. 
5 "Sandy Hook Elementary Shooting: What Happened?" CNN. Cable News Network, n.d. Web. 10 Apr. 2013. 
6 "United Human Rights Council." United Human Rights Council. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Apr. 2013. 
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Arendt’s argument that it was “bafflingly naïve” to think that Eichmann did not display the 
stereotypical behaviors of an evil individual7. Zaibert writes that “banal wrongdoers are utterly 
common”, and it was therefore naïve to believe that Eichmann would be an evil megalomaniac 
during his criminal trial. However, I disagree with this position, and in support of Arendt’s 
disappointment with the rather boring nature of Eichmann, it may seem that she associated 
Eichmann’s actions with a disturbing disregard for the value of human life. This is a reasonable 
association to make because Eichmann was responsible for sentencing countless individuals to 
their death. In this sense, his actions shake one to their core. I do not think it is fair to say that her 
disappointment with Eichmann’s clerk-like behavior was naïve given the gravity of his actions. 
 By analyzing other violent crimes, it can be argued that Arendt’s expectation was not 
unwarranted. For example, Idi Amin, the president of Uganda in the 1970s was singlehandedly 
responsible for the systematic oppression of his people. Under his totalitarian rule, he sentenced 
scores of people to death. His behavior suggested that a grandiose sense of self-worth may have 
driven his immoral behavior. Until his death, he maintained the belief that his actions were 
justified and that Uganda still needed his leadership8. Despite their several dissimilarities, 
Eichmann and Amin are comparable figures because of their responsibility for the deaths of 
countless individuals. However, while the former displayed banal behaviors, the latter showed 
the kind of attitude reflective of what Arendt was searching for in Eichmann. While Arendt may 
have gone too far in expecting to see the devil himself with Eichmann, it is not altogether absurd 
too be surprised when someone with such a disturbing criminal record has the demeanor of a 
clerk.  
                                                
7 Zaibert, Leo. "Beyond Bad: Punishment Theory Meets the Problem of Evil." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 36 
(2012): 93-111. Print. 
8 "Idi Amin, ex-dictator of Uganda, dies". USA Today. 16 August 2003. Retrieved 8 August 2009. 
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 Thus, Zaibert’s argument that “banal wrongdoers are utterly common” warrants 
additional evidence. He does not provide examples of other war criminals that have had rather 
ordinary demeanors. While Eichmann may have appeared boring in his courtroom trial in Israel, 
he may have been megalomaniacal during the prime of his crime spree. Zaibert cannot make the 
assumption that because Eichmann was rather boring and ordinary during his criminal trial, that 
he was similarly boring and ordinary during the time when he was in charge of executing 
countless individuals. The example is interesting, and ought to be the subject of further 
discussion because investigations of personality and crime are a topic I explore later in this 
paper. 
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-Chapter 2- 
Bad, Evil, and Sadistic Actions 
 
 In this thesis, I do not contend that these are the absolute defining features of bad, evil, 
and sadistic action. I am merely providing suggestions for what I believe may be helpful in 
differentiating between these types of actions. In this chapter, I will justify my definitions for 
bad, evil, and sadistic actions. I define a bad action as an action that inflicts, or attempts to 
inflict, temporary or transient harm on another agent without just cause. I define just cause as 
self-defense. For example, punching my colleague sitting next to me, studying diligently for his 
developmental biology exam, is bad. If, in a fit of anger from excessive studying, he decides to 
tackle me and I punch him in response, then I have not committed a bad action because I had just 
cause. I define evil as an intensifier of bad. Evil is magnifier of bad, in which one inflicts 
permanent or long-lasting harm on another person. For example, shooting my colleague sitting 
next to me would be evil. If my colleague tried to shoot me, and I shot him in response, then I 
did not commit an evil action. I define sadistic actions as actions that are committed to add insult 
to injury. For example, shooting my colleague sitting next to me, setting the corpse on fire and 
mailing the ashes to his family members would be sadistic. 
 Sadistic actions are neither evil nor bad. They are a category unto themselves. They are 
the actions that we find particularly insulting in the context of a wrongdoing. Sadistic actions 
therefore follow bad or evil actions as part of a sequence. Consider the example provided: I shoot 
my friend, then set his corpse on fire and mail the ashes to his family. The evil action was the 
shooting because I inflicted permanent harm by killing my friend. But the sadistic action was 
setting his corpse on fire and mailing his ashes. There was no clear strategy to this action other 
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than to insult him. The sadistic action does not make sense without the prerequisite evil action. I 
cannot mail my friend’s ashes to his family if there was no murder to begin with. The sadistic 
action has added significance outside of the initial crime as a distasteful insult to the victim. 
 I argue that sadistic actions therefore fit in the framework of a sequence of actions. First, 
a given individual commits a bad or evil action, and we classify this action as the initial 
wrongdoing. This wrongdoing has a context because this crime is a violation of typical moral 
norms, and society usually prepares a response in the form of punishment. However, following 
this violation, the criminal performs an additional action that, within the context of this initial 
violation, takes on a higher level of significance. It adds an insult to injury. In addition to 
harming another individual, the criminal elects to insult the victim further by insulting this 
person’s suffering. 
 Furthermore, I contend that only human beings can perform sadistic actions. In the 
natural world, omnivores and carnivores may hunt and therefore harm other animals, but this 
happens as part of a cycle driven by the food chain and the transition of biomass from lower to 
higher energy trophic levels9. Sometimes an act in the natural world that we would consider to be 
a moral wrongdoing has a biological and evolutionary significance. For example, when a 
competing male lion kills the current male lion of a pride, he proceeds to kill all of the cubs 
belonging to the previous male. Without an understanding of the natural biology of these 
animals, this would appear to be a cruel act. However, it is now understood that the male does 
this cause the lionesses to enter estrus, therefore allowing him to mate and pass his alleles to the 
                                                
9 McShaffrey, D. "Trophic Levels." Leaders in Environmental Activism. Marietta College, n.d. Web. 
<http://www.marietta.edu/~mcshaffd/lead/trophic.pdf>. 
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next generation10. To transpose my theory if harm and wrongdoing to animals is inappropriate, 
because only humans display an understanding of how to continually develop unique and 
insidious methods of inflicting harm. 
 Before moving on, in this essay, I will assume that the agent of action is a normal human 
being. I define a normal human being as one that responds to, and recovers from, harm at an 
improvable rate. For example, one may argue that Dan, who was insulted in the 3rd grade for his 
weight and never emotionally recovered, is an example that compromises my that relies on the 
concept of recovery. This is an example of the overly sensitive person never recovers from minor 
instances of harm. Since every rude comment will gets under his skin and perpetually haunt him, 
then by definition, these acts are evil. On the other hand, one may consider the example of the 
individual who experiences massive amounts of harm (assault or rape, for example), but recovers 
remarkably quickly. Since this person recovers at such a fast pace, then they were not the victim 
of a bad or evil action. 
 I response, I concede that there are individuals who are overly sensitive as well as 
individuals who are extremely tough. However, their normal counterparts significantly 
outnumber these individuals. I contend that while a normal response to difficulty may be a vague 
parameter to some, I believe it is suitable for the needs of this paper. Most individuals grapple 
with harm in varying degrees, but they typically do not border on the extreme. If Dan was 
insulted for his weight in 3rd grade, and did not recover emotionally, then I place the 
responsibility of harm on Dan for not being mature enough to understand that miniscule insults 
ought not affect one so deeply. I cannot be held to that standard of recovery in this paper because 
it is an unreasonable and infrequent example. Similarly, the individual who displays a 
                                                
10 Patsalides, Laurie. "Why Do Male African Lions Kill Cubs? Learn the Process of a Male Lion Taking Over a 
Pride." Bright Hub. Disqus, 9 Oct. 2011. Web. 10 Apr. 2013. <http://www.brighthub.com/environment/science-
environmental/articles/60010.aspx>. 
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remarkable ability to recover from harm that would cripple most people cannot be held to the 
normal standard of recovery I establish in this paper. This is because it would be difficult to 
actually harm someone with such a high propensity for recovery. For example, the rape victim 
who recovers from the physical and psychological trauma has a higher ability to recover from 
harm than the everyday individual. My arguments therefore exclude examples such as this, 
because their resilience is just as infrequent as the overly sensitive individual. 
 I defined sadistic actions as actions that add insult to injury. Zaibert follows a similar line 
of thought in his characterization of evil actions. He argues that evil actions have a certain 
“pointlessness” to them (107). They do not serve a clear purpose, but are insidious in their 
nature.  
He writes:  
“What I would like to suggest is that what is special about evil actions is 
something related both to thoughtlessness and to excessiveness: a certain 
pointlessness. Con- sider another example. When cattle cars were insufficient for 
transporting victims to extermination camps, the Nazis would use regular 
passenger trains. In these occasions, victims were forced to pay the regular one-
way fare for the journey (to their certain death). As with previous examples, while 
being sent to a gas chamber is obviously the most harmful, charging the fare is 
what strikes us as evil. But the charging was utterly pointless: every victim was 
going to be dispossessed of every- thing she owned anyhow. It is pointless not in 
lacking utilitarian sense, but in the sense that it defies understanding, that it is 
hard to wrap our minds around it: not in the sense that it is excessively harmful, 
and not in the sense of it being somehow necessarily “thoughtless.” (107). 
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I partially agree with this, and would like to present the following objection. Zaibert faces the 
following dilemma in his systematic characterization of wrongdoing. If he is presented with the 
case of an individual who shoots ten people and then charges them for the bullets, then he would 
state that it was bad to shoot ten people but evil to charge them for the bullets used. Zaibert 
preemptively responds to this objection by stating that badness does come in degrees:  
“This unitary form of wrongdoing admits of degrees, and it is variegated within 
itself (say, you could commit wrongs against people, or against property), but the 
assumption is that wrongdoing is essentially one single phenomenon. Murder, for 
example, is more serious than theft, because it is more harmful; similarly, 
genocide is more serious than murder, again because it is more harmful—but 
these are all wrongs in essentially the same sense” (93).  
However, this does not explain what these criteria are and how we can compare bad actions. 
While I would agree that genocide is more serious than murder and is more harmful, he does not 
explain how we can weigh harm. He also does not believe that evil actions are necessarily worse 
than bad actions or vice versa. He simply argues that they are truly different forms of 
wrongdoing:  
“…it is clear that the destruction, indignity, and death which took place during 
Kristallnacht was extraordinarily more harmful than the fine—but the fine which 
followed Kristallnacht is a better candidate to being evil (even if much less 
harmful than Kristallnacht)” (96). 
By stating that bad and evil actions can inflict different levels of harm, Zaibert concedes that the 
terms bad and evil are used to describe forms of wrongdoing rather than levels of harm. And 
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while he made this explicit in the beginning of his paper (93), this indicates that bad and evil 
have no association with measurements of harm, because bad actions may be more harmful than 
evil actions and vice versa. I would argue in response that by excluding levels of harm as 
distinguishing features of bad and evil, he misses an opportunity to view actions in terms of their 
effects. This is important because if he is to argue that bad and evil are two unique types of 
wrongdoing and have no relation to the amount of harm committed, then he ought to provide 
some calculus for comparing harm.  
 This forces him to understate the magnitude of moral wrongdoings on a relative scale. It 
is unfair to state that shooting ten people is merely bad relative to charging them for the bullets, 
which he states is evil, even if harm has nothing to do with his metric for distinguishing between 
bad and evil actions. The rhetoric “bad” and “evil” implies a relationship governed by 
magnitude. For example, if Zaibert were presented with an example of destroying an entire 
neighborhood versus shooting multiple people, he state that both are bad actions, but do not 
qualify as evil. If he was to compare the murder of one individual versus the murder of ten 
people, he would state that both are bad, and that the latter is more harmful than the former, but 
that neither is evil. This, to me, seems to understate the magnitude of these crimes because 
following his designation of both crimes as bad, he would have to qualify it by stating that one 
was, nevertheless, more harmful than the other. I contend that while they are morally 
reprehensible, the term “bad” implies a lower level of harm prima facie, rather than a 
conceptually different act: the more harmful crime was evil rather than bad but more harmful 
than the other crime. There ought to be some consideration of the level of harm when 
distinguishing between different types of moral wrongdoings because regardless of how the 
example is presented, the victim is more affected by the more harmful crime. 
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 My definitions of bad, evil, and sadistic solve this problem by allowing an examination of 
actions that allow for both quantitative and qualitative comparisons. In the example of the 
Kristallnacht, I would argue that the long-lasting destruction of the Jewish community is evil, 
while charging them would be characterized as sadistic. What Zaibert may have been searching 
for is the element of insult in his discussion of the insidious pointlessness of evil actions. The 
decision of the Nazis to charge the Jewish community for the destruction of their property may 
have been driven by a desire to insult them, and magnify their humiliation. 
 Sadistic actions are not more harmful than bad or evil ones. It is a conceptually distinct 
form of wrongdoing. Sadistic does not imply a higher magnified version of evil, or bad. It simply 
means that the action committed was a different form of harm than a bad or evil action. They are 
qualitatively rather than quantitatively different. In viewing the relationship between bad, evil, 
and sadistic actions, I would argue that evil actions are subset of bad actions because of their 
magnified nature. And in most instances, I will assume actions with a high magnitude of harm 
are committed more infrequently than actions with a low magnitude of harm. In contrast, sadistic 
actions occupy a set of actions that are separate from bad and evil actions, but would not make 
sense without the context of a bad or evil action. For example, the Nazis could not have charged 
the Jewish community for the destruction of their property during the Kristallnacht without 
destroying beforehand. 
 Using this way of categorizing wrongdoing may be more effective because it provides the 
philosopher with a more versatile base to categorize and describe actions by not restrict 
descriptions of wrongdoing to only two terms exclusively distinguished by the qualitative nature 
of the crime. This is not to say that having four or five terms is better than three, because I only 
propose the use of these terms in order to allow for both quantitative and qualitative 
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comparisons. Using the word sadistic exclusively for actions that add insult to injury in the 
context of bad or evil actions solves for this problem. 
 According to my definitions of bad, evil, and sadistic actions, attempted harm is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for wrongdoing. Attempted harm is observable and reflects 
intent. The philosopher cannot be expected to deduce intent from confessions of the wrongdoer, 
but can rely on the actions committed and attempts to harm. By attempting to harm another 
person, the intent to cause harm is rather clear. If I attempt to shoot my friend but fail, then it can 
be concluded that I wanted to shoot my friend. Consider Eichmann, who argued that he was 
simply a cog in the machine. In this case, we can turn to the numerous instances he voluntarily 
sentenced people to death. Eichmann did not hesitate when presented with the opportunity to kill 
certain individuals. He did not merely attempt to harm other people; it was his approval that 
certified their execution. 
 The use of harm as a parameter for definitions of bad and evil actions, I argue, is useful, 
but Zaibert presents an objection:  
“Assume that X, Y, and Z, are evil acts; presumably, attempting to do X, Y, and 
Z, would be evil too—and attempted evil acts need not cause harm at all. So, if 
evil can be attempted, definitions of evil that focus on harm—as Kekes’ and 
Card’s do—face obvious difficulties. For the possibility of attempting evil 
suggests that harm (serious or not) is not even a necessary condition for evil after 
all” (106). 
To this, I present the following responses. First, there is a distinction between attempted harm 
and harm itself. If harm is attempted, then it can end in two possibilities: harm is either inflicted 
or it is not. Definitions that rely exclusively on the actual infliction of harm as the basis for 
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wrongdoing, I agree, face difficulties. But this is different from definitions, such as mine, that 
focus on attempted harm. The difference is that by attempting to harm another individual, the 
intent has already been made clear. 
 Additionally, Zaibert uses the phrase “extraordinarily bad” to refer to the actions of the 
Kristallnacht (106). By saying that some actions are extraordinarily bad, as opposed to a little 
bad, he implies that bad actions fall along a spectrum. Some actions may be really bad while 
others are just a little bad. While he states that badness comes in variegated degrees (93), but this 
compounds the difficulty of being able to weigh harm. Evil actions, according to his criteria, 
fulfill a form of insidious pointlessness, but he does not provide a spectrum along which to 
compare evil actions. This is problematic because he is willing to argue that the Kristallnacht 
was extraordinarily bad, but charging the community for its destruction is evil. If the 
Kristallnacht was extraordinarily bad, then it could be argued that it could simply be a form of 
wrongdoing that was less evil than charging the community, a significantly more evil action. 
 By conceding that moral wrongdoings have a spectrum, Zaibert requires an additional 
criteria for conceptually distinguishing between bad and evil actions. He has to explain why 
some actions would be extraordinarily bad as opposed to slightly evil. What may be a qualitative 
difference in intent according to his criteria may instead by a slight difference in the quantity of 
the crime. In response, Zaibert may argue that this is an irrelevant objection because he is only 
interested in evil actions, and evil actions are conceptually distinct from bad actions regardless of 
the amount of harm committed. However, this may devolve into a slippery slope because the 
destruction of an entire community’s property could be construed as pointless as well. This 
requires a more in-depth explanation of what makes an action insidiously pointless as opposed to 
very harmful. 
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 In contrast, my framework may allow for a set of conceptually distinguishing criteria 
along a spectrum of actions that are bad or evil. Given the example of the Kristallnacht, I would 
argue that it is evil because it was the permanent and long-lasting destruction of a community. 
This is an ‘injury’ for the community, and it would take quite some time to rebuild the 
neighborhood and therefore ‘recover’. The decision to charge them, however, is insulting in the 
context of the destruction, and sadistic. In order to compare evil (or bad) actions to sadistic 
actions on a spectrum, I would argue that this is best served by weighing the attempted harm. If 
we compare the evil actions of burning a home down versus shooting someone in the head, then 
it can be seen that the harm from shooting someone in the head is more permanent and long 
lasting. This allows us to place evil actions on a spectrum. Comparing the bad actions of 
punching someone in the arm versus breaking someone’s arm, it can be seen that punching 
someone in the harm confers more temporary harm. This also allows us to place bad actions on a 
spectrum. 
 One could argue in response that the distinction between bad and evil actions becomes 
blurred since I haven’t defined transient vs. long-lasting harm. Therefore, what might be 
considered a bad action should actually be viewed as an evil action. I would response to this 
argument by stating that harm can be measured by the ability to recover. If the ability to recover 
is minimal or small, then it is evil. If the ability to recover is high, then it is bad. In order to 
compare sadistic actions to each other, then we can compare the extent to which the insult is 
distasteful. I define distasteful as offensive. If we compare charging the community for the 
destruction of their own neighborhood versus charging the family for the cost of the bullet that 
murdered their loved one, then prima facie we would likely state that the latter is more 
distasteful and offensive than the former, and therefore more sadistic.  
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 In order to rectify the imbalance caused by moral wrongdoings, we need to apply a 
working definition of justice. Zaibert explains the role of fittingness in just punishment when he 
writes “Since fittingness is intimately linked to justice, and since only retributivists care about 
fittingness, they are also the only punishment theorists decisively concerned with justice” (97). 
The problem with this argument is that Zaibert states that fittingness is intimately linked to 
justice, but does not explain why this is the case. This is problematic because what Zaibert, the 
retributivist, views as justice may not be the case at all for the consequentialist. By presenting 
what characterizes justice, rather than what defines it, he faces the difficulty of defending a 
position that may constantly change. For example, justice in his view may be characterized as the 
most fitting punishment, but other features may also characterize it.  
 He provides a description of justice by stating that, “The retributivist wants justice for its 
own sake; often justice involves punishment, but on other occasions it involves other things in 
addition to (or instead of) punishment” (111). This is helpful because it means that Zaibert is not 
arguing that justice is exclusively characterized by fitting punishment. However, it introduces 
additional ambiguity because he does not define these other properties of justice. Reading 
further, it appears that he defines justice as desert (101), but this only begs the question further. 
In terms of desert, the retributivist defines desert as the most fitting punishment. But it is not 
clear why the most fitting punishment for the crime is what the doer of evil or bad actions 
deserves. A working definition of justice is an interesting topic for consideration, because it 
affects the discussion comparing the efficacy of retributivist versus consequentialist punishment. 
 The consequentialist view, I argue, is not given a fair representation for how it would 
assess Eichmann’s actions and punishment. Justice, or a just punishment from the 
consequentialist view, would be defined as punishments that have a rehabilitating, deterring, or 
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other positive benefit. In response, Zaibert states that the problem is that, “In dismissing the 
difficult problem of giving people what they deserve, consequentialists are exposed in their 
cavalier sidestepping of the normative discussion of justice. Struggling (conceptually) with evil 
is a problem worth having” (97). However, perhaps the consequentialist, in his or her attempt to 
understand how a punishment can affect the criminal, is not sidestepping, but trying just as hard 
to engage in a normative discussion of justice and conceptual approach to evil because they want 
punishment to confer a positive benefit. From the context, it may be concluded that the most 
fitting punishment for a crime is the most just one. But since there is no definition of justice to 
corroborate this argument, it remains to be explained. It is also not clear what a “decisive” 
concern with justice actually entails. An explanation of the difference between a concern with 
justice and a decisive concern with justice is required to illustrate the problem Zaibert may have 
seen with the consequentialist discussion of justice.  
 Nevertheless, I would argue that Zaibert stipulates that an attempted act of harm does not 
actually inflict harm. For example, if I intend to shoot and kill my friend studying next to me, but 
only shoot and temporarily wound him, then I have still actually inflicted harm even though it 
was not the harm that I had intended. I have still committed a moral wrongdoing in the process. 
Specifically, I committed a bad action because the harm would be temporary and transient. If I 
had killed him, then it would have been an evil action. 
 Furthermore, Zaibert’s argument that, “For the possibility of attempting evil suggests that 
harm (serious or not) is not even a necessary condition for evil after all”, is problematic because 
attempting to commit a moral wrongdoing suggests that harm is not just a necessary condition, 
but a central feature. John Kekes’ definition that harm is a requirement runs into the problem of 
overlapping ambiguity through the use of the phrase “excessiveness”, as Zaibert points out (106). 
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However, I would argue that attempted harm is a necessary feature of moral wrongdoing, 
because it is the measure by which philosophers can conclude intent. A display of the intent to 
harm through the actual attempt to harm provides philosophers with grounds to classify the type 
of moral wrongdoing committed. If I attempt to shoot my friend sitting next to me as he studies 
for his developmental biology exam, but miss, I have still displayed my shoot him. Attempted 
harm, regardless of whether or not it is committed, displays a desire on the criminal’s part to 
inflict pain or suffering on the victim, therefore illustrating a necessary prerequisite for moral 
wrongdoing. 
 When a moral wrongdoing has been committed, it is important to consider the 
blameworthiness of the individuals responsible. With regards to this topic, Zaibert writes:  
To say that a certain act was “merely” bad is not to say that it was less 
blameworthy than an evil act, or that it caused less harm than an evil act: it is 
merely to conceptually distinguish it from this other form of wrongdoing. We can 
understand the badness of some acts, and we thus condemn and punish them 
severely; nothing in our understanding them prevents us from reacting—on the 
contrary. But because evil—insofar as it is pointless—defies our understanding, 
so many thinkers have agonized over what exactly justice demands in its 
aftermath (108). 
I would like to elaborate slightly more on this argument by defining blame. I define blame as 
responsibility for a certain action. Blameworthiness is the extent to which one can be held 
accountable for an action. Using this framework I do not contend that the perpetrator is to be 
held variably accountable depending on the moral wrongdoing committed. Instead, I would like 
to focus on Zaibert’s conceptually distinguishing feature of bad from evil. He argues that 
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because evil displays certain pointless features that defy conventional understanding, it is 
difficult to come up with a fitting punishment.  
 In response, I would state that first, using the framework I have provided, the punishment 
for an evil action would simply be higher up along the 45-degree line Zaibert presents in his 
paper (96). For bad or evil actions, which differ by magnitude, punishment ought to vary by 
magnitude as well, remaining as fitting as possible. Since bad or evil actions differ 
quantitatively, punishment can similarly occupy a relative scale. If grand theft auto of a civilian 
vehicle is worth one year in prison, then grand theft auto of a police vehicle would be worth 
more. In this sense, the retributivist is well equipped to deliver justice. 
 Second, what I have defined as the sadistic action in my paper is what most closely aligns 
with Zaibert’s definition of evil. I characterized a sadistic action as one that is specifically geared 
towards adding insult to injury, supervening a previously evil action. Zaibert contends that evil 
actions are pointless, but perversely strategic. And like Zaibert, I agree that there comes a point 
where the extent we punish an action reaches a certain maximum. However, unlike Zaibert, I 
contend that the retributivist need not necessarily grapple with the burden of creating a fitting 
punishment for the sadistic crime. This is because it is nearly impossible to punish someone for 
insult to injury. There is no systematically reliable method for quantifying sadistic infractions. 
The consequentialist is in a better position because their burden is not to create the most fitting 
punishment. Their burden is to devise the punishment with the most rehabilitating, deterring, or 
any other beneficial, properties.  
 By punishing sadistic actions and evil actions similarly, there would be a problem of 
quantifying the harm inflicted by a sadistic action. Zaibert recognizes this problem and notes that 
bad and evil actions would be punished equally (110). I propose a different solution: beyond evil 
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the punishment need not fit the crime. Instead, it must fit the perpetrator. The punishment must 
be designed to serve non-retributive purposes for the perpetrator, and instead focus on 
rehabilitation or deterrence. This is because it is deeply problematic to quantify an insult to 
injury and use a retributive approach to justice. Sadistic actions, and their insult to injury, cannot 
be measured. In the design of punishment, comparisons of the distastefulness of sadistic actions 
may not be weighable to the point of practical application. A court cannot state that some insults 
are worse than others, there is no real way to measure the harm of a perverse insult. I propose 
that it is in our advantage to adapt to this problem with an approach to punishment that would 
allow for the application of some justice as opposed to none. I contend that the consequentialist 
is better equipped to deliver justice than the retributivist for sadistic actions.   
 By using a consequentialist approach for punishing sadistic actions in conjunction with a 
retributive approach for punishing bad and evil actions, we can respond with more effective and 
consistent calculi for punishment. Limiting the tools of justice to only retributive means would 
ignores the potential benefits of a consequentialist punishment. Rehabilitation and deterrence are 
valuable ends, and it would be helpful to consider the benefits they may confer to theorists and 
lawmakers. I argue that while both retributivism and consequentialism are competing 
conceptions of justice, they hold equal value depending on the context.  
 Retributive justice assumes that authorities can design a punishment that is reciprocal to 
the initial crime committed. In fact, Zaibert writes, “A precondition of retributivism, then, is that 
we understand wrongdoing, so as to make the punishment fit it” (96). Under circumstances 
where a crime cannot be measured, such as a sadistic action, then it is not practically feasible to 
use a retributive punishment. Using a consequentialist punishment in place of a retributive one 
for sadistic actions therefore requires an additional set of considerations for evaluating sadistic 
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actions, and methods for achieving the desired ends (rehabilitation, deterrence, etc.) most 
effectively. 
 This entails a closer investigation of the motivation behind the crime committed because 
sadistic actions capture a conceptually unique form of wrongdoing. This is necessary because 
first, only through intent can the retributivist learn the motivation for harm. For example, the 
attempt to add insult to injury could stem from racism, classism, or some other form of hate and 
discrimination. Understanding the basis of the perpetrator’s motivation creates a profile for 
context in the criminal trial. If Eichmann was not racist, then his position as a lieutenant colonel 
in the Nazi regime would make less sense. His punishment was framed in the context of his 
profile as a criminal. This may allow for better-informed decision making within the context of 
punishment. Second, by understanding intent more closely we can develop a better method of 
categorizing sadistic actions. It may help the theorist to potentially distinguish between different 
forms of sadistic actions. For example, seeing the types of sadistic actions performed during the 
Kristallnacht in the framework of a racist ideology may give further insight into the nature of war 
crimes committed in, say, the Rwandan genocide. The same intent that drove Nazi generals 
could be used to understand the intent that drove Rwandan Hutu generals. Third, understanding 
intent contributes to the development of a better a concept of action. An improved concept is 
action contributes to punishment theory because only actions can be punished. By understanding 
actions more thoroughly, punishment may likewise benefit. 
 One may refute my burden to find intent by arguing that I am presenting an abusive and 
nearly unattainable goal by trying to discern the motivation of the sadist. However, I would 
respond that sadistic actions reflect a perversely unique understanding of harm. By transcending 
merely physical harm, the perpetrator demonstrates his or her willingness (and thus, intent) to 
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devise a conceptually unique and insidious need to harm their victim. This is sufficient to meet a 
need to devise intent. By adding insult to injury, the sadist demonstrates a unique method to, and 
understanding of, harm. 
 For example, it was not simply an accident that Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, during 
the Columbine Shooting, called one of their victims the N-word, stating that his life was 
meaningless seconds before their murder. There was a perverse strategy to it, and it helps the 
retributivists to understand the intent behind this strategy. It may help the formulation of a more 
fitting punishment by profiling the criminal. Harris and Klebold displayed minimal regard for 
human life as they indiscriminately shot their peers11.  
 The burden, therefore, for punishment theorists is not to devise the punishment to fit their 
insidious nature of their sadistic actions, but to understand the cogs and gears driving the 
thinking that led to it. In this sense, the punishment doesn’t fit the crime, but the sadist. 
Therefore, the punishment would be that the sadist, as opposed to the evil perpetrator, would 
have to spend time explaining their thinking and reasoning behind their need to provide insult to 
injury. This position has several problems, but I am prepared to deal with them accordingly. 
 After questioning the criminal and discerning the motivation for his or her actions, I ask 
the retributivist to spend his or her time trying to understand the thoughts and behaviors that lead 
to the need to provide insult to injury. I agree with Zaibert that there is no real solution to coming 
up with a fitting crime for sadistic (or evil as he would say) actions. Instead, I ask the retributivist 
to spend their time elsewhere, in areas where their efforts are more likely to accrue valuable 
findings for future use. By understanding the thinking behind sadistic actions, we are in a better 
                                                
11 National Geographic. "Columbine". The Final Report. Season 1. Episode 9. 
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position to potentially prevent future instances of sadistic actions, or at least approach them more 
effectively. 
 Before going on to this, I would like to address Zaibert’s other argument regarding the 
criminal’s purpose in performing evil actions: 
My view can accommodate both evil acts of agents who aim at the bad for its own 
sake (say, de Sade), and the evil acts of drab bureaucrats (say, Arendt’s 
Eichmann). In pursuing bad for its own sake, sadists, ex hypothesi, exhibit great 
pointlessness—it is hard to wrap one’s mind around acting only in the pursuit of 
pain. (Artists, in contrast, can be said to desire beauty for its own sake, but this 
would not be thereby pointless: since beauty is good, there is always a point in 
producing it—we certainly can understand someone devoting her life to 
producing beauty.) In caring for bureaucratic minutiae to the extent that it numbed 
his sensitive to harrowing human suffering, the actions of Arendt’s Eichmann also 
exhibit great pointlessness (109). 
Insofar as the criminal’s actions inflict harm on the victim, it is important to distinguish between 
different forms of harm: pain versus suffering. It is important to make this distinction because 
understanding the type of harm the criminal wanted to inflict on the victim may give insight into 
his or her motives. I would argue that pain is primarily physical whereas suffering has both 
physical and emotional connotations. The sadistic action is not simply limited to pain, because its 
effects go beyond the physical and seem to insidiously target the psyche. The sadist’s actions, 
therefore, inflict suffering by adding insult to injury. This illustrates that the criminal may be 
motivated by a need to harm their victim psychologically. I iterate that these are purely 
theoretical considerations, and do not claim to have performed rigorous case studies to support 
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these claims. However, they may point to potential motives for the criminal. In this sense, an 
understanding of the potential motives of the criminal may allow for consequentialist punishment 
with more effective rehabilitative or deterring effects. 
 The sadist may not perform his or her actions for the sole purpose of inflicting suffering. 
In fact, their actions may serve a practical purpose as well. For example, as Zaibert describes, the 
Nazis told incoming prisoners that they were going to the showers, and that they should 
remember the stall in which they placed their clothes. This distraction would increase the 
likelihood of their compliance as they unknowingly walked straight into their death chamber 
(107). In contrast, in some instances, sadistic actions may not fulfill any particularly intelligible 
purpose other than inflicting pain for personal pleasure. For example, Eric Harris and Dylan 
Klebold harangued one of their victims, an African-American male, as he hid beneath one of the 
tables in the Columbine High School’s library. They hurled several racial slurs at him just before 
committing their murder. This sadistic action seems to have fulfilled no practical purpose if their 
original goal was to only kill their peers. It is from this framework that we can devise two 
different forms of sadistic actions: strategic and perverse. Strategic sadistic actions fulfill a 
higher purpose and fit within the framework of a higher goal; the Nazis mislead their prisoners in 
order to increase compliance. Perverse strategic actions are done for twisted pleasure, and 
nothing else; Harris and Klebold simply wanted to humiliate their victim before performing their 
execution.  
 Furthermore, I would like to address the topic of negligent action. Acts are considered 
negligent when one does not care about something for which they should have cared. If one does 
not care about the act, then they are negligent. In this case, I make an appeal to an objective 
standard: a reasonable person. While there may always be individuals that do not care about the 
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consequences of their actions, I will assume that most people do care about the effects of their 
actions. Some may argue that this is an unreasonable assumption, but it would be unfair to hold 
my theories to the standard of individuals who continually disregard actions for which most 
people would express some level of concern. 
 One may argue that I am simply making a cosmetic change to Zaibert’s arguments. What 
he would label as evil, I would label as sadistic. We both make a commitment to the idea of the 
conceptually unique nature of this harm. However, in contrast to Zaibert, I do not believe that a 
perverse pointlessness is the preferable method for distinguishing between bad and evil actions. I 
argue that the magnitude of harm plays an important role in classifying wrongdoing. John Kekes 
also contends that the difference between bad and evil actions is magnitude. For him, the crucial 
element to distinguish between bad and evil actions is the magnitude of the harm12. In a certain 
sense, I have outlined a position that strikes a middle road. While I argue that the difference 
between bad and evil actions is a matter of recovery, this idea still aligns with Kekes in the sense 
that I am discussing quantitative differences in harm. However, actions that insult the victim in 
the context of an injury fulfill a conceptually distinct form of wrongdoing, and are sadistic 
actions. 
 My method of distinguishing between bad, evil, and sadistic actions may combine the 
benefits of both positions without their potential limitations. While Zaibert’s distinction between 
bad and evil focused exclusively on a qualitatively unique form of wrongdoing, it did not allow 
for an effective comparison for how harmful these actions were. In contrast, Kekes’ distinction 
between bad and evil focused exclusively on a quantitatively unique form of wrongdoing. 
Nevertheless, both positions reflect important considerations for morally reprehensible actions. 
                                                
12 John Kekes. Facing Evil. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 45 and passim. Taken from Zaibert 
“Punishment Theory Meets the Problem of Evil”. See 7. 
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-Chapter 3- 
Punishing Badness, Evil, and Sadism 
 
 The difference between a strategic and perverse action forms the basis for my theory of 
how to punish bad, evil, and sadistic actions differently. I contend that bad and evil actions can 
be punished on a scale to fit the magnitude of the infraction committed. For bad and evil actions, 
the punishment ought to be retributive because retributivism focuses on a punishment that fits the 
crime. Insofar as my measurement of harm is directly correlated with the ability of the victim to 
recover, then the retributivist is in a better position to quantify harm. Since retributive justice 
relies on the ability of the philosopher to measure the magnitude of the infraction and design a 
punishment with equal reciprocity, then this form of justice is more appropriate for a bad and 
evil response. 
 In the case of sadistic actions, the theorist must create a profile of the criminal and 
determine the deep-rooted basis of their intent and motivation. This is because the philosopher 
cannot quantify magnitude of the harm caused by a sadistic action. This cannot be done because 
first, an insult to injury is a physical action with psychological repercussions. For example, by 
burning my friend’s corpse and mailing the ashes to his family, I have committed exclusively 
physical actions, but the effects on his family would go far beyond his actual murder. There is an 
insidious intent to not just harm, but cripple, the victim both emotionally and psychologically. It 
is because of this disturbing intent that the philosopher cannot be limited to an exclusively 
retributive punishment. It would not be possible for him or her to measure the suffering from 
being sent, say, the ashes of a family member. Thus, we ought to resort to other tools that may 
allow for a punishment that would still serve some purpose. 
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 Some may argue in response that I cannot use two different approaches to criminal justice 
in order to punish the individual: retributivism and consequentialism. This is because I would be 
using a definition that suits my purposes in some instances, switching to another definition in 
other instances when it becomes too difficult to defend the previous definition. For bad and evil 
actions I support a retributive punishment because that seems easier, and for sadistic actions I 
support a consequentialist punishment because that seems easier.  
 In response, I argue that this criticism assumes that is unfair to use two definitions of 
justice. I propose the opposite: it is in the theorist’s interest to consider multiple definitions of 
justice when designing a punishment. Under different circumstances, we cannot expect a singular 
definition of justice to work most effectively. Using this approach, I view different definitions of 
justice (retributivism and consequentialism) as tools in a toolbox. To solve a certain type of 
problem, it is preferable to use a screwdriver rather than a wrench, and when facing another type 
of problem, the opposite may be the case. To limit oneself exclusively to a one-tool-fits-all 
philosophy may hinder our ability to punish the criminal most effectively. And my goal in this 
paper is to develop an approach that allows the punishment theorist to better distinguish between 
different types of moral wrongdoings, allowing for a more appropriately designed punishment. 
Just as we do not hold reprehend the mechanic for using different tools to fix different problems, 
we ought not do the same for the philosopher. 
  I therefore propose that the punishment for sadistic infractions should be consequentialist 
in nature. In the case of a sadistic action, we are in a position to punish the criminal in a way that 
serves rehabilitating or deterring purposes. For example, if an individual murdered another 
person because of his or her skin color, and burned the corpse, then the evil action would be the 
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murder and the sadistic action would be the decision to burn the corpse. Thus, to fit the crime of 
murder, the criminal would serve 25 years to life. 
 Zaibert states that the retributivist is troubled to find the most fitting punishment for these 
conceptually unique wrongdoings. He writes: 
“It should then be clear why assuming that evil is an independent form of 
wrongdoing poses a problem for retributivists and not for consequentialists. For 
only retributivists wish that there be a fit between wrongdoing and our response to 
it, and it is unclear what would be a fitting response to evil. It is not even clear 
whether the talk of desert is intelligible in the case of evil—for we are after all 
assuming that evil and bad are really different” (97).  
Therefore, he places himself in a position that allows for a consequentialist response. However, 
one problem with his argument is that he states that retributivists are the only theorists decisively 
concerned with justice because they are the only ones interested in quantifying or measuring 
harm, and then designing a reciprocal punishment. The problem with the consequentialist 
according to Zaibert, then, is that insofar as he or she does not care about understanding the 
crime in order to design an appropriate punishment, then he or she is not truly concerned with 
justice. They do not care about truly understanding the crime because they are only concerned 
with, say, rehabilitative or deterrent effects. To this I respond that the consequentialist may be 
just as, if not more, concerned with understanding justice than the retributivist. This is because 
the consequentialist, in order to design a punishment with rehabilitative or deterring properties, 
has to delve into the psychology of the criminal in order to understand why they committed their 
crime and design a punishment that would rehabilitate them from the ill will that drove them, or 
deter them from believing that the cost of their crime outweighed the benefit of not committing it 
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at all. To punish the sadistic action, however, the criminal would receive rehabilitating or 
educational “punishment”. In this sense, only the consequentialist position is capable of 
decisively dealing with sadistic infractions. By providing a rehabilitating punishment for the 
sadist, the consequentialist targets the psychology of the criminal whereas the retributivist may 
become frustrated trying to devise a truly fitting punishment. The consequentialist delves deeper 
into an investigation of intent than the retributivist, creating a rehabilitating, deterring, or 
educational program for the criminal. 
 Consider the individual who tortures animals for no reason. This person douses dogs in 
gasoline and proceeds to light them on fire. The retributivist would be concerned with measuring 
how much harm the criminal has inflicted, and appropriating a punishment that would be 
equivalent. The consequentialist, in order to rehabilitate this twisted individual, would have to 
understand why they found pleasure in setting animals on fire in order to develop a punishment 
that would rehabilitate them of this desire to harm innocent animals. This is just one example 
that I propose could illustrate how the consequentialist would be just as decisively concerned 
with justice as the retributivist. Understanding the psychology of the criminal and developing a 
profile seems to be just as burdensome a task as trying to measure the quantity of harm inflicted. 
I do, however, argue that the retributivist is indeed equipped with the tools to handle some 
situations more appropriately than the consequentialist. The retributivist is in a better position to 
punish bad and evil actions because these actions vary simply by magnitude. Magnitude is within 
the realm of a retributivist punishment because it is quantifiable and measurable on a relative 
scale. For wrongdoings that are conceptually unique and un-measurable, then the retributivist has 
the unresolvable burden of creating a fitting punishment for a crime that cannot be rightly 
understood.  
 34 
 Therefore, in my program I contend that by understanding the criminal’s intent as closely 
as possible, a profile of his or her personality and, by extension, motivations can be constructed. 
This profile places the consequentialist in a position to devise a program for, say, rehabilitating, 
or deterrence. For the consequentialist, this program will meet their definition of punishment, 
because it brings about a positive consequence. 
  Zaibert states that, “By focusing on desert, the retributivist makes short shrift of 
consequentialist considerations: beyond the very act of administering justice, she does not care 
much about the good consequences that punishment may bring about. The retributivist cares little 
about rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation, etc. The retributivist is not, ultima facie, 
necessarily opposed to achieving these other ends, but she thinks that they do not play too crucial 
a role in the justification of punishment itself” (96). The problem with this argument, however, is 
that it concedes that good consequences play a somewhat crucial role in the justification of 
punishment. This means that in my proposal for a new framework of punishment, the bad and 
evil actions can be punished with a retributivist method. The punishment should fit the infraction 
as closely as possible. But the sadistic action, which Zaibert admits poses a genuine conundrum 
for the retributivist, should be punished with a consequentialist method. Since Zaibert admits 
good consequences play a crucial role (albeit minor) in justifying a punishment, then according 
to his position, he may not object to this proposal. 
 Furthermore, no individual is wholly angelic. Humans eventually commit wrongdoing at 
one point or another. Zaibert writes that, “consequentialists think that what justifies punishment 
is not that it is deserved but that it brings about some good ulterior consequence, such as 
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and deterrence” (96). For the person who commits a sadistic action, 
it would be highly advisable to undergo a punishment that brought a positive consequence. One 
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of the differences between the normal person who commits a bad action at some point, and the 
criminal who commits an evil action followed by a sadistic action is mental health. To punish the 
sadistic actions of an individual in order to rehabilitate or deter him or her ought to be sufficient 
justification for punishment. 
 The proposal I have outlined for a new approach to punishing bad, evil, and sadistic 
actions involves a unique approach to analyzing action. The retributivist is interested in 
designing a punishment that fits the magnitude of the infraction committed whereas the 
consequentialist is interested in designing a punishment that, say, has rehabilitating or deterring 
effects. These two approaches to punishment interact differently with my theory of action. It is 
important for punishment to be designed with a theory of action in mind because it gives further 
insight into the action committed, and the nature of the crime itself. Therefore, understanding 
how an action is generated may help a decisive application of justice. And by justice, I mean the 
use of guiding principles to correct the imbalance of a moral wrongdoing. The retributivist would 
view this guiding principle to be that of fittingness while the consequentialist would use guiding 
principles of, say, rehabilitation or deterrence. Since actions form the basis of punishment, a 
concept of action may help the design of more effective punishments. In the beginning of this 
paper, I defined action as an event that is sequenced in the order of reflection and execution, 
reflection as the thought relating to the possible consequences of action before execution, and 
execution as the series of movements that collectively carry out the action. 
 The retributivist punishment for bad and evil crimes focuses on the execution of the 
action. This is because execution is the actual manifestation of the crime. This moral infraction 
results in an imbalance in the existing state of affairs, and it is the retributivist’s burden to restore 
this balance with a fitting punishment. Since the retributivist is concerned with the most fitting 
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punishment, they will focus the design of their punishment with the execution in mind. For 
example, the magnitude of the action, the way it was performed, the effects the action had on 
others, are all considerations for the retributivist. 
 In contrast, the consequentialist punishment for sadistic crimes focuses on the reflection 
of the action. Reflection is thought relating to the possible consequences of an action before 
execution. During reflection, the criminal may have weighed the potential consequences of his or 
her crime, and decided that the benefit (personal satisfaction) was greater than the cost 
(punishment). Reflection is only incorporated into the action if the action is performed. Since the 
consequentialist is concerned with, say, rehabilitating or deterring effects of punishment, then he 
or she will focus the design of their punishment with the reflection in mind. For example, the 
thoughts that led the criminal to perform the action, the criminal’s thoughts during the action, 
how his or her personal background may have led to behavior conducive to this type of crime, 
are all considerations for the consequentialist. 
 In this sense, neither the retributivist nor consequentialist has a higher claim to 
approaching action and therefore punishment more decisively. While the retributivist is more 
focused on the execution of the action, the burden is to understand the mechanics and effects of 
the action in order to respond with an equivalent punishment. And the consequentialist is more 
focused on the reflection component of the action, developing an understanding of the criminal’s 
intent in order to provide a punishment with a positive ulterior consequence, such as 
rehabilitation, deterrence, or education. 
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Conclusion 
 
 In this paper, I have considered the potential for actions to be analyzed in terms of the 
thoughts the lead up to them (reflection) as well as their physical manifestation (execution). 
Moral wrongdoings can be classified as bad, evil, or sadistic actions. Bad and evil actions are 
assessed in terms of their magnitude. The magnitude of a crime is measured in terms of the 
ability of the victim to recover. Bad actions inflict transient or temporary harm whereas evil 
actions inflict long-lasting or permanent harm. Bad and evil actions comprise one conceptually 
distinct form of wrongdoing. These actions are primarily painful, and are not performed with the 
specific intent of causing suffering. Pain is primarily physical whereas suffering is both physical 
and psychological. Sadistic actions comprise another conceptually distinct form of wrongdoing. 
Sadistic actions are performed in the context of a bad or evil action in order to add insult to 
injury. They are insidious in their inventiveness and cannot be measured in terms of magnitude. 
In order to punish bad, evil, and sadistic actions, I propose the use of a retributivist punishment 
for bad and evil actions and a consequentialist punishment for sadistic actions. Retributivism is 
more effective for assessing the magnitude of the crime and designing a fitting punishment, 
making it better suited to deal with bad and evil actions. In contrast, sadistic actions cannot be 
measured; thus, consequentialism is a more effective as a tool for understanding the cause of the 
crime and designing a punishment that rehabilitates or deters the criminal from future crime.  
  
 
 
 38 
References 
1) Davidson, Donald, 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
2) Des Forges, Alison (1999). Leave No One to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. 
Human Rights Watch. ISBN 1-56432-171-1. Retrieved January 12, 2007. 
3) "The Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki." History.com. A&E Television 
Networks, n.d. Web. 10 Apr. 2013. 
4) "James Holmes Appears in Court Being Accused of Killing 12 People in Aurora 
Cinema Shooting." BelleNews.com. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Apr. 2013. 
5) "Sandy Hook Elementary Shooting: What Happened?" CNN. Cable News 
Network, n.d. Web. 10 Apr. 2013. 
6) "United Human Rights Council." United Human Rights Council. N.p., n.d. Web. 
10 Apr. 2013. 
7) Zaibert, Leo. "Beyond Bad: Punishment Theory Meets the Problem of 
Evil." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 36 (2012): 93-111. Print. 
8) "Idi Amin, ex-dictator of Uganda, dies". USA Today. 16 August 2003. Retrieved 8 
August 2009. 
9) McShaffrey, D. "Trophic Levels." Leaders in Environmental Activism. Marietta 
College, n.d. Web. <http://www.marietta.edu/~mcshaffd/lead/trophic.pdf>. 
10) Patsalides, Laurie. "Why Do Male African Lions Kill Cubs? Learn the Process of 
a Male Lion Taking Over a Pride." Bright Hub. Disqus, 9 Oct. 2011. Web. 10 
Apr. 2013. <http://www.brighthub.com/environment/science-
environmental/articles/60010.aspx>. 
 39 
11) National Geographic. "Columbine". The Final Report. Season 1. Episode 9. 
12) John Kekes. Facing Evil. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 45 and 
passim. Taken from Zaibert “Punishment Theory Meets the Problem of Evil”. 
